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RECENT DECISIONS
whether or not for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the
witness, since the effect was to prejudice the minds of the jurors.
Grenadier v. Surface Transportation Corp. of New York, 271
App. Div. 460, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 130 (1st Dep't 1946).
To impeach a witness' credibility, much is allowed. However,
the above cases indicate a trend towards limiting the extent of
cross-examination for impeachment. This restriction is two-fold.
First, certain areas have been banned, e. g. previous negligent acts,
whether or not affecting credibility. Grenadierv. Surface Trans.
Corp. of N. Y., supra. Second, from a position of leaving complete
control in the hands of the trial judge, the courts in People v. Bilanchuk, supra, and the instant case, have taken it upon themselves
to decide whether the cross-examination was a legitimate attack
on credibility.
It is the writer's opinion that where an appellate court limits
a trial judge's discretionary area in allowing cross-examination
for impeachment purposes by forbidding certain subjects, it is
acting within its proper sphere. However, where the appellate
court, as in the instant case, substitutes its opinion for that of
the trial judge as to whether or not the cross-examination was
for the purpose of attacking credibility, it is not acting properly
and is seriously interfering with the right of cross-examination.
Alan H. Levine
FEDERAL PROCEDURE - APPEALABILITY OF DENIAL
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 (a) (c) (e) on his complaint praying for both
a temporary and permanent injunction to prevent defendants
from copying plaintiff's trade name and corporate title was
denied by the District Court. Held: The order denying the
motion was appealable under 28 IU. S. C. A. 1291, 1292(1). Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 217 F. 2d 936 (2d Cir. 1954).
Finality has been the historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure ever since it was written into the first Judiciary
Act. (Now 28 U. S. C. A. 1291). Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U. S. 323 (1940). The basis for this policy is not only to
protect judicial administration from piecemeal litigation but also
to eliminate delays and avoid obstruction of just claims which
would otherwise be jeopardized by harassment and the cost of
the various successive appeals before final judgment. Catlin v.
United States, 324 U. S. 229 (1945).
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The rule is subject to statutory qualification: 28 U. S. C. A.
1447 creates a further restriction by forbidding review in any
manner of a district court order remanding a case to a state court,
but the bonds are relaxed somewhat by Section 24 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A. 47, which allows interlocutory appeal
of proceedings in bankruptcy and 28 U. S. C. A. 1292(1) where certain interlocutory injunctions may be appealed from.
The principle of finality has been treated by the courts with
great liberality. 6 Moore, Federal Practice 113 (2d ed. 1948)
(hereinafter cited as Moore). Thus a denial of a petition to prohibit the use of certain documents before a grand jury because
of a constitutional privilege was held to be a final order. Perlman
v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918), though an order denying a
motion to quash a grand jury's subpoena duces tecum on other
grounds is non-appealable. Cobbledick v. United States, supra.
Similarly a decree directing the delivery of deeds and property
was held to be final because of its irreparable effect even though
an accounting was still to be had, Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201
(U. S. 1848), while the accounting was held to be a necessary ingredient for finality in condemnation proceedings since an adequate
award might result in acquiescence in the disposition of the earlier
issues. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U. S. 62 (1948).
See also, United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F. 2d 678
(2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied 317 U. S. 698 (1943). Under the collateral order theory, the denial of a motion to require security
for costs and expenses in a shareholder's derivative action was
held appealable even though it was not directly involved in the
merits of the claim. Cohen r. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U. S. 541 (1949). However, the special rule of finality involved in the multiple claim provision of Rule 54(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an adjudication of one or
more but less than all of the multiple claims is interlocutory unless
the District Court issues a certificate of finality. Republic of China
v. American Express Co., 190 F. 2d 334 (2d Cir. 1951). Additional
review may be had under 28 IT. S. C. A. 1651 (All Writs Statute)
when an order is otherwise not appealable, whenever the Supreme
Court or other federal courts deem it necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdictions. 6 -Moore58-109.
The result has been unsatisfactory, since the uncertainty of
finality can deprive a litigant of his opportunity to appeal if he
fails to do so within the prescribed time. Dickinson v. Petroleum
Conversion Corp., 338 U. S. 507 (1950).
This confusion has been caused by the vacillation of the courts
in balancing the sound policy behind the general rule of finality
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against the claim of the individual case that justice demands immediate review. 6 Moore 68. For an excellent analysis see 6
Moore 45-286.
The problem of finality becomes even more vexing when the
courts are interpreting 28 U. S. C. A. 1292(1). 5 Moore 734-747.
One interpretation permits appeal from an order staying an action
at law pending the determination of an equitable claim, the order
being tantamount to an interlocutory injunction within the scope
of 28 U. S. C. A. 1292 (1). Etteson v. Metropolitan Life, 317
U. S. 188 (1942). However the doctrine seems to be overruled by
City of Morgantown W. Va. v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U. S. 254 (1949) ;
but see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion. Even the
extension of a temporary restraining order has been held to be
an interlocutory injunction that is appealable. Sims v. Greene,
160 F. 2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947).
The instant case presents a slightly different aspect of the
problem. As pointed out in the majority opinion, the denial falls
within a literal interpretation of the statute. This has been considered so clear that no analysis of the problem was deemed necessary in Raylite Electric Corp. v. Noma Electric Corp., 170 F. 2d
914 (2d Cir. 1948); and the Fifth Circuit so held in International
ForwardingCo. v. Brewer, 181 F. 2d 49 (5th Cir. 1950). However,
the Third Circuit after a thorough review of the problem felt that
such a denial would not be appealable, for if based on the facts
shown, it merely postpones decision until the trial and is not
considered as an application for a preliminary injunction. Morgenstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Co., 181 F. 2d 160 (3d Cir.
1950). A summary judgment, however, does not depend only on
the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. As Judge
Hand recognized in the majority opinion, it also requires the
moving party to be entitled to such judgment as a matter of law
under Federal Rule 56(c). Since there was some indication that
the denial was on this latter basis, Judge Hand felt that the order
was final and hence appealable. Nevertheless, he also held that
the denial in itself should be appealable. It is from this latter
contention that Judge Clark vigorously dissented.
It is the writer's opinion that Judge Clark's dissent is the
better position. There is nothing in the denial of a summary
judgment which has an irreparable effect or precludes further
review at a later time. If the basis of denial is that no claim to
relief exists as a matter of law, summary judgment should be
granted for the opposing party under a procedure comparable to
that used under Rule 12 (Judgment on the Pleadings), where the
court, on its own motion, may grant whatever relief it deems
proper. This type of judgment has always been considered ap-
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pealable. 6 Moore 2321-2322. However, since the courts do not
always follow this procedure, it would be better practice for
either party to move explicitly for an interlocutory injunction
under 28 1T. S. C. A. 1292(1). Morgenstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Co., 181 F. 2d 160 (3d Cir. 1950). Judge Frank, in the instant
case, indirectly arrives at this result by treating the order as such
a denial since part of the complaint asked for such temporary
relief, but the fundamental difficulty of uncertainty of review remains. The need for reform has been recognized by the Supreme
Court. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U. S. 507
(1950) (particularly Mr. Justice Black's dissent). It is hoped that
the Supreme Court or Congress will make it clear what procedure
should be followed.
Leonard F. Walentynowiez
INCOME TAX - DIVIDENDS IEL) TAXABLE INCOME
IN YEAR OF ACTUAL RECEIPT
Taxpayer, on a cash basis, received dividends on his federal
savings and loan association shares by mail in 1950. They were
declared and payable on December 31, 1949 at which time taxpayer had the right to appear personally at a company office and
demand payment. Held: The dividends were not constructively
received during 1949, but constituted 1950 income. Commissioner
v. Fox, 218 F. 2d 347 (3d Cir. 1954).
INT. REv. CoDE. oF 1939, § 42(a), 53

STAT 47 (now INT. REv.
oF 1954, § 451(a) provides, "The amount of all items of
gross income shall be included in the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer . ...
The Commissioner contended that the
fact that the taxpayer could have gone to a company office and
demanded payment on December 31 made the income taxable in
1949 under the doctrine of constructive receipt. This treats as
taxable income which is unqualifiedly subject to the demand of a
taxpayer on a cash basis, whether or not such income has been
actually received in cash.
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In Avery v. Commissioner, 292 U. S. 210 (1934), it was held
that when it is the practice of the corporation to pay dividends
by mail, it cannot be said that the dividends are "cash or other
property unqualifiedly subject to the taxpayers demand" until
the checks are actually received by the stockholders. Prior to the
Avery decision, the Commissioner maintained and lower courts
frequently decided that dividends were taxable to taxpayers on a
cash basis in the year in which they were declared and mailed.
See Sohearman v. Commissioner, 66 F. 2d 256 (2d Cir. 1933).

